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Abstract: 
The direct social perception (DSP) thesis claims that we can directly perceive some mental states 
of other people. The direct perception of mental states has been formulated phenomenologically 
and psychologically, and typically restricted to the mental state types of intentions and emotions. 
I will compare DSP to another account of mindreading: dual process accounts that posit a fast, 
automatic “Type 1” form of mindreading and a slow, effortful “Type 2” form. I will here analyze 
whether dual process accounts’ Type 1 mindreading serves as a rival to DSP or whether some 
Type 1 mindreading can be perceptual. I will focus on Apperly and Butterfill’s dual process 
account of mindreading epistemic states such as perception, knowledge, and belief.  This account 
posits a minimal form of Type 1 mindreading of belief-like states called registrations. I will 
argue that general dual process theories fit well with a modular view of perception that is 
considered a kind of Type 1 process. I will show that this modular view of perception challenges 
and has significant advantages over DSP’s phenomenological and psychological theses. Finally, 
I will argue that if such a modular view of perception is accepted, there is significant reason for 
thinking Type 1 mindreading of belief-like states is perceptual in nature. This would mean 
extending the scope of DSP to at least one type of epistemic state. 
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Direct Social Perception and Dual Process Theories of Mindreading 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Mindreading is the ability to understand and respond to the mental states of other agents. The 
nature of the cognitive processes enabling mindreading has been an important research question 
for decades, but recent research has focused on providing a more fine-grained analysis of the 
phenomena and mechanisms of mindreading. This includes characterizing the phenomenological 
experience of mindreading, delineating the various environmental contexts in which we 
mindread and the task demands of those different contexts, and determining the representational, 
architectural and processing characteristics of our mindreading mechanism(s).  
 The direct social perception (DSP) thesis is one recent attempt to recharacterize the 
phenomena of mindreading (e.g., Bohl & Gangopadhyay, 2014; Gallagher, 2008a,b; Gallagher & 
Varga, 2014; Gangopadhyay & Miyahara, in press; Krueger, 2012; Krueger & Overgaard, 2012; 
McNeill, 2012; Smith, 2010, in press; Zahavi, 2007, 2008, 2011). DSP rejects the idea that most 
mindreading involves an inferential process from perceptual information about a person’s bodily 
and verbal behavior to a cognitive representation of the mental states underlying that behavior. 
While admitting that we do sometimes make these sorts of inferences from behavior to mental 
states, DSP claims that there is also a type of mindreading involving the direct perception of 
others’ mental states. DSP advocates have generally focused on intentions and emotions as the 
mental state types capable of being directly perceived. The following passage by Max Scheler 
captures this position about emotion:  
 
For we certainly believe ourselves to be directly acquainted with another person’s joy in 
his laughter, with his sorrow and pain in his tears, with his shame in his blushing, with his 
entreaty in his outstretched hands. . . If anyone tells me that this is not ‘perception’, for it 
cannot be so …I would beg him to … address himself to the phenomenological facts. 
(Scheler, 1954, p. 260)  
 
Similar claims are made about directly perceiving intentions: For example, if I reach toward the 
cup to my left, others can directly perceive my intention to drink from the cup.  
In order to help articulate the commitments of and evaluate DSP, I will compare it to 
another recent type of mindreading account: dual process accounts (e.g., Apperly, 2011; Apperly 
& Butterfill, 2009; Butterfill & Apperly, 2013a,b). Dual process accounts of mindreading claim 
we engage in two main types of mindreading, one relatively fast, automatic, unreflective, and 
cognitively efficient, the other relatively slow, controlled, reflective, and cognitively effortful. 
Further, they often posit that physically and/or functionally distinct psychological mechanisms 
enable these two mindreading types. This approach follows within the larger tradition in 
psychology of dual process theories that distinguish two general types of psychological 
processes, Type 1 and 2 processes, and often further claim these process types are enabled by 
distinct psychological mechanisms, often labeled System 1 and 2 (e.g., Evans, 2010; Evans & 
Frankish, 2009; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Frankish, 2010; Kahneman, 2003, 2011).  
An initial motivation for comparing DSP and dual process mindreading accounts is that 
they both treat slow, deliberate, effortful mindreading and fast, automatic, effortless mindreading 
as distinct psychological kinds. Dual process accounts are explicit about this and often posit 
separate psychological mechanisms responsible for these two types of mindreading phenomena. 
DSP advocates have been less focused on characterizing psychological mechanisms, but clearly 
treat perceptual and non-perceptual mindreading as distinct psychological types. This places DSP 
and dual process accounts in opposition to views that treat fast and slow mindreading as two 
modes of operation of the same basic type of psychological process or mechanism—for example, 
Carruthers (2013) argues that intuitive and reflective mindreading use the same basic 
representational resources.  
But while both DSP and dual process accounts treat fast, automatic mindreading as 
psychologically distinctive, DSP is unique in characterizing it as perceptual in nature. The dual 
process literature certainly identifies perception as a paradigmatic example of a fast, automatic 
psychological process. But dual process accounts of mindreading tend not to even consider the 
possibility of perceptual mindreading as advocated by DSP. This invites the question of the 
relationship between DSP and dual process accounts of mindreading. Should they be seen as 
rival accounts of fast, automatic mindreading, with only one offering an accurate characterization 
of these mindreading phenomena? Or are they actually identifying distinct subtypes of fast, 
automatic mindreading, some perceptual and others non-perceptual?  
One reason for thinking DSP and dual process accounts may be compatible accounts of 
distinct mindreading phenomena is that they often focus on different mental states types. As 
mentioned above, DSP advocates usually only claim that intentions and emotions can be directly 
perceived; they do not make this claim about perceptions, beliefs, or thoughts (e.g., Gallagher & 
Varga, 2014, p. 190). There are, however, dual process mindreading accounts of the fast, 
automatic understanding of epistemic states such as belief—one of the most influential and well-
articulated being put forward by Ian Apperly and Stephen Butterfill (Apperly, 2011; Apperly & 
Butterfill, 2009; Butterfill & Apperly, 2013a,b). As we’ll see below, Apperly and Butterfill argue 
that use of the full-blown concept of belief as a propositional attitude is likely too cognitively 
demanding to enable fast, automatic mindreading. They instead explain Type 1 belief 
understanding in terms of a “minimal” mindreading system operating with a non-propositional 
concept of “belief-like” states called “registrations,” rather than the concept of belief proper. The 
point for now is that perhaps DSP and dual process accounts can be made compatible by treating 
DSP as a thesis about intentions and emotions, leaving dual process accounts to characterize fast, 
automatic attribution of epistemic states.   
Why have DSP advocates in this way restricted the scope of their thesis to intentions and 
emotions? The main motivation for doing so seems to be the claim that mental state types that 
are closely connected  (perhaps constitutively connected) with particular behaviors seem the best 
candidates for the DSP thesis. This is because everyone agrees we can perceive people’s bodily 
behavior. So it is less controversial to treat mental states closely connected to behavior as being 
perceived. Intentions and emotions seem to be mental state types fitting this description. For 
example, as Spaulding (in press) puts it, “it is part of the concept of intention that an intention to 
Φ is correlated strongly with Φ-ing” (p. 3). Similarly, emotions are rather tightly associated with 
particular behavioral expressions—think of the prototypical facial expressions of the basic 
emotions. Epistemic mental states such as perception and belief, however, are much less tightly 
connected with any particular behaviors. As critics of behaviorism famously emphasized, how 
one acts will depend on not only one’s beliefs, but also a host of other mental states. 
Accordingly, it is less plausible that a person’s beliefs could be directly perceived.  
It is worth considering, however, whether this restriction of the scope of the DSP thesis 
stands up to further scrutiny. Indeed, Butterfill and Apperly (2013b, p. 7) themselves have 
recently mentioned the issue of the observability of mental states, remaining open minded about 
the DSP thesis and its application to their mindreading account. I will here explicitly take up the 
task of analyzing whether Apperly and Butterfill’s account of fast, automatic attribution of 
belief-like epistemic states should be considered perceptual or non-perceptual mindreading. This 
task of determining what mental states types should fall within the scope of DSP thesis requires 
investigating what properties are essential to categorizing a mindreading process as perceptual or 
non-perceptual. The way I will address this issue is by investigating the dual process literature’s 
own discussions of perception, and comparing it to other discussions of perception in the 
philosophy and psychological literature and the account of perception given by DSP advocates.  
In sum, my primary motivation for comparing DSP with dual process accounts of 
mindreading is that both address fast, automatic forms of mindreading. Given that dual process 
accounts of Type 1 understanding of epistemic states are not formulated in terms of DSP, it is 
possible that fast, automatic mindreading will subdivide into perceptual and non-perceptual 
forms based on a distinction between mental state types that are more or less intimately 
connected to behavior. But it is a relatively unexplored question whether this possibility is 
empirically and theoretically motivated. This paper will make some initial inroads into this issue, 
focusing on whether Apperly and Butterfill’s account of fast attribution of belief-like states 
should fall within the scope of DSP.  
I will begin in section 2 by summarizing the commitments of DSP. Then in section 3 I 
will describe dual process theory, focusing in particular on Apperly and Butterfill’s account of 
epistemic-state attribution, particularly their account of the Type 1 attribution of belief-like 
states. In section 4, I will explicitly compare the two accounts. I will first examine what the dual 
process literature has to say about the nature of perception. I will show that the dual process 
perspective adopts a roughly modular account of perception that can be classified as a kind of 
Type 1 process and that is commonly adopted within the philosophical and psychological 
literature on the nature of perception. I will then compare this modular view of perception with 
DSP’s account of perception. I will argue that the modular view of perception challenges DSP’s 
standard phenomenological and psychological theses, but still allows for DSP’s central claim 
that mental states can be perceived. Specifically, I will argue that Apperly and Butterfill’s 
account of Type 1 mindreading of belief-like states largely fits this modular view of perception. 
Thus, I will contend that, if we assume the truth of the modular view of perception (which 
admittedly is not uncontroversial), there is significant reason for treating belief-like states as 
falling within the scope of the DSP thesis. 
  
 
2.  Direct Social Perception 
 
As Michael & De Bruin (this issue) articulate, following Bohl and Gangophadyay (2014), DSP 
can be read as making metaphysical, epistemological, phenomenological, or psychological 
claims about the perceivability of (some) mental states. I will focus on the phenomenological and 
psychological theses, which make the most contact with dual process theories.   
 
2.1. DSP’s Phenomenological Thesis 
 
DSP understood as a phenomenological thesis claims that we can become aware of others’ 
mental states by “directly” experiencing them. This direct experience of others’ mental states is 
positively characterized as a form of perception similar to the perceptual experience of physical 
objects; it is negatively characterized as being unlike the experience of forming a belief about 
something via inference from perceptual information about something else. For example, 
Gallagher (2008a) compares DSP to visually perceiving his car: 
 
At the personal or conscious level, I do not have to perceptually piece together the shape 
and the color and the mass in order to get my car. Even if the sub-personal processes are 
complex (and I do not deny that they are), the perception that I have of my car is direct—
I see it right there in front of me. I do not have to glue anything together, add an 
interpretation or add an inference. (p. 537) 
 
Gallagher contrasts this kind of perceptual experience with experiential phenomena where 
“something [is] added to perception, e.g., an inference or interpretation that goes beyond what is 
perceived” (p. 537). For instance, “if my car was terribly totaled in an accident, I may not 
recognize it at first and I may have to use certain clues about its appearance to infer that it is my 
car” (p. 537). DSP theorists in this sense treat perception as involving “direct” phenomenological 
experience of something present in our environment. As Zahavi (2011) puts it, our experience of 
another’s mental state “can be said to be direct in the sense that that state is my primary 
intentional object… the state is experienced as actually present to me” (p. 548). DSP advocates 
contrast this direct experience with indirect mental state understanding, where we first perceive 
something other than the target object/property, and afterward experience at least one additional 
psychological process in order to, in the end, become aware of the target (Zahavi, 2011, p. 548).  
The core of this phenomenological account of direct perception thus seems to be the 
following: X is directly perceived if X is part of the content of our conscious experience, X is 
experienced as present, and this content is generated in a phenomenologically immediate way. It 
is key that what is directly perceived is itself “my primary intentional object,” as Zahavi put it. If 
I look at a thermometer, the temperature itself is not my primary intentional object. The 
thermometer is experienced as a representation or sign of the temperature. So on this account the 
temperature would not itself by directly perceived. Thus for mental states to be directly 
perceived, another person’s mental state would need to be consciously experienced as present to 
me, and this experience must not be generated by first experiencing something else that we use 
to become aware of the mental state. 
 DSP does not deny that we sometimes become aware of others’ mental states indirectly 
via conscious reasoning, whether by the imaginative simulation posited by the simulation theory 
(ST) (e.g., Goldman, 2006) or the theoretical inference proposed by the theory theory (TT) (e.g., 
Gopnik & Wellman, 1992). For example, a friend might tell you that Rosario was not hired for 
her dream job, and from this infer that Rosario is unhappy. In such a case you don’t directly 
experience Rosario’s unhappiness, but instead infer it from the linguistically conveyed 
information about Rosario’s not getting the job. Similarly, you might perceive David sitting 
quietly, and based on this behavioral evidence plus your conscious belief that David’s girlfriend 
just broke up with him, consciously infer that David is sad. In this case David’s sadness is not 
experientially present to you, but is something you consciously infer from perceiving his 
behavior plus conscious background knowledge. Without denying such experiences of indirect, 
non-perceptual mindreading do sometimes occur, DSP does reject the idea that all mindreading 
experiences are indirect in this way. DSP instead claims that we often can directly perceive 
people’s intentions and emotions.  
  Note that DSP theorists do distinguish the direct experience we have of other people’s 
mental states from the direct experience we have of our own mental states (see, e.g., 
Gangopadhyay & Miyahara, in press; Zahavi, 2007, 2008). Determining how exactly to 
characterize this phenomenological difference, as well as the difference between social 
perception and object perception, are important projects for DSP’s phenomenological thesis (see 
Gangopadhyay & Miyahara, in press). 
In sum, direct social perception is phenomenologically defined as mindreading where 
others’ mental states are experientially present to us in an unmediated, immediate way. This is 
contrasted with experientially indirect mental state understanding, where conscious reasoning 
(e.g., mental simulation or theoretical inference) is used to generate a conscious mental state 
attribution. 
 
2.2. DSP’s Psychological Thesis 
 
DSP is also sometimes framed non-experientially, in terms of the psychological processes 
enabling mental state understanding. The main focus here is the distinction between perceptual 
processes and post-perceptual cognitive processes. 
According to DSP’s account of the literature (which I do not endorse; see Herschbach, 
2008), traditional mindreading accounts such as TT and ST treat perception as providing 
information about people’s words and deeds, not their mental states. To understand others’ 
mental states thus requires cognitive processes that use perceptual or verbal information about a 
person’s behavior and their environment to infer their mental states. For example, TT claims that 
the mindreader represents a body of theoretical information about the causal/rational relations 
between mental states, behavior, and environmental conditions (e.g. “people who don’t get what 
they want tend to be upset”). For TT, such theoretical information about minded beings must be 
used to infer the mental states possessed by a particular person at a particular time. While ST 
denies that mindreaders must possess theoretical knowledge about minds, it (according to DSP 
advocates) similarly claims that perception alone cannot allow us to understand people’s minds. 
According to DSP’s interpretation of ST, mental state understanding comes from mentally 
simulating the mental states likely exhibited by another person, and making an inference from 
the simulated mental state to an attribution of that mental state to the target person.  
 DSP’s psychological thesis denies that post-perceptual cognition is always needed to 
access other minds; it instead claims that some mindreading occurs via perception alone. To 
distinguish DSP’s psychological thesis from its phenomenological thesis, one cannot simply 
appeal to an experiential difference between perceptual and non-perceptual mindreading. 
Unfortunately DSP advocates have not been especially clear on this point. Typically they define 
perceptual processes negatively, by saying what they do not involve. One such negative thesis is 
that DSP does not involve theory- or simulation-based inference, since these are defined by DSP 
advocates as cognitive processes (e.g., Gallagher & Varga, 2014).  
Sometimes DSP’s psychological thesis is more baldly stated by associating cognition 
with inference, and thus negatively defining perceptual mindreading in terms of non-inferential 
psychological processes (Gallagher, 2008b). As Michael & De Bruin (this issue) mention, 
however, mainstream cognitive psychology and neuroscience characterize perception as an 
inferential process: sensory transducers generate low-level informational states that go through 
several stages of information-processing to generate higher-level perceptual representations of 
the environment (e.g., Pylyshyn, 1999). Even if these processes don’t involve logical 
relationships between propositionally structured representations, most psychologists characterize 
these information-processing operations on representational states as inferences in a looser sense. 
Gallagher & Varga (2014) have explicitly backed off the strong anti-inference view by allowing 
perception to involve such “Helmholtzian” inferences; but they still deny that DSP involves 
theory- or simulation-based inference, which are treated as non-perceptual, cognitive processes.  
What grounds this distinction between perceptual, Helmholtzian inferences and non-
perceptual, cognitive inferences? Gallagher & Varga (2014) offer a few arguments. They first 
argue that Helmholtzian inferences “are not rich enough to underpin mindreading” (p. 193): 
Helmholtzian inferences are characterized as simpler processes required for basic object 
recognition, and do not make use of information about mental states. Thus, Helmholtzian 
inferences could not support mindreading. But this seems to simply assume without argument 
that perceptual inference cannot operate with higher-level contents such as mental states. Many 
have advocated for the general view that perception is “theory laden” (e.g., Churchland, 1979; 
Kuhn, 1962) or “cognitively penetrable” (e.g., Siegel, 2010, 2011). Several recent authors have 
applied such an approach to argue that if we define DSP phenomenologically, TT and ST can be 
interpreted as subpersonal-level accounts of the psychological processes enabling such 
perceptual experiences (Bohl & Gangopadhyay, 2014; Carruthers, 2013, p. 144; Herschbach, 
2008; Lavelle, 2012; Spaulding, 2010).  
Why do DSP advocates believe it is wrong to treat simulation- or theory-based inferences 
as part of perceptual processes themselves? Gallagher & Varga’s (2014) argument here is less 
clear. But they are definitely resistant to saying perceptual processes are made more complex by 
the addition of theory- or simulation-based inferences. They instead propose that social and 
cultural factors (e.g., implicit racial biases) can “shape” or “transform the perceptual process 
itself,” appealing to the notion of neural plasticity as a mechanism for how this occurs without 
the addition of inferential processes (p. 196). Given that their “transformation” account is not 
especially well fleshed out, it is difficult to evaluate its merits relative to the argument that 
theoretical inferences can “cognitively penetrate” and thus be part of a perceptual process. But 
by offering this alternative account, Gallagher & Varga have not directly addressed why they 
think it is wrong to characterize simulation- and theory-based inferences as constitutive parts of 
perceptual processes.  
In sum, DSP’s psychological thesis seems to come down to the claim that mindreading 
need not involve cognition, and sometimes can involve just perception. DSP advocates do not, 
however, offer a detailed discussion of the differences between cognition and perception, mostly 
relying on the claim that mental simulation and folk psychological theorizing are inferential 
cognitive processes, and thus not involved in perceptual mindreading.   
 
2.3.  Phenomenological and Psychological Theses About the Nature of Perception 
 
In sum, DSP’s phenomenological and psychological theses offer two ways of characterizing a 
perceptual mindreading. The phenomenological version says a mental state is directly perceived 
if a mental state is experienced as present and this conscious content is generated in a 
phenomenologically immediate way. DSP’s psychological thesis attempts to define the 
perceptual form of mindreading in non-phenomenological terms. But this is where DSP 
advocates have been less clear about what they take to be characteristic of perception versus 
cognition. Perception-based mindreading is largely defined negatively, in terms of what kinds of 
cognitive processes it purportedly does not involve, namely, simulation-based or theory-based 
inference.   
 As we’ll see in the next section, dual process accounts also make phenomenological and 
psychological claims about mindreading.  
 
 
3.  Dual Process Theories of Mindreading 
 
In this section I will first describe general dual process theories in psychology, and then describe 
theories of mindreading that fit this general picture—in particular, Apperly and Butterfill’s dual 
process account of the attribution of epistemic states. 
 
3.1. Dual Process Theories in Psychology 
 
Philosophers and psychologists have for centuries proposed that the mind is not unitary. But 
modern dual process theories have developed over the last 30-40 years across various subfields 
of psychology, including learning, reasoning, decision making, and social cognition (see 
Frankish & Evans, 2009). In the last 15-20 years researchers have tried to unite these approaches, 
developing domain-general dual process theories (e.g., Kahneman, 2003, 2011; Stanovich, 1999, 
2005). To illustrate their two kinds of psychological processes, compare how you would solve 
the following two math problems (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 20-21):  
 
2 + 2 = ? 
17 x 24 = ? 
 
As you read the first problem, the answer comes to your mind almost immediately, with little to 
no effort required. But to answer the second problem would require (for most people) a 
conscious, effortful process, probably using pen and paper. These two math problems typify the 
contrast between, respectively, Type 1 and 2 processes.  
Researchers generally appeal to a cluster of features when defining Type 1 and 2 
processes (Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Frankish, 2010; Frankish & Evans, 2009). 
Some of the more commonly emphasized features concern speed, automaticity, and 
consciousness. The title of Kahneman’s (2011) recent book prioritizes the characteristic of speed, 
contrasting fast Type 1 processes and slow Type 2 processes. Sometimes the emphasis is placed 
on whether or not a psychological process is under the control of the agent, contrasting automatic 
processes that occur whenever they are triggered by the appropriate stimuli, with controlled 
processes that can be decoupled from the immediate stimulus conditions, initiated at will, and 
can override automatic responses. Speed and automaticity can be understood as purely 
subpersonal-level processing traits, but they are often given a phenomenological characterization 
as well. Accordingly, Type 1 processes are often characterized as unconscious or preconscious, 
while Type 2 processes are conscious. Similarly, the contrast between low effort and high effort 
processes seems to be characterized phenomenologically as much as in terms of subpersonal-
level properties. Given the lack of agreement about how to define and study consciousness, 
however, dual process theories tend to emphasize the kinds of subpersonal-level processing traits 
studied by cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists: e.g., the capacity of information a process 
can handle (high vs. low), the types of operations performed on that information (associative vs. 
rule-based), how many such operations can occur at any given time (parallel vs. sequential 
processing), and whether or not working memory is required.  
 Dual process theories have developed in the last 10-15 years into accounts of dual 
systems, usually called, following Stanovich (1999), System 1 and System 2. Dual system 
theories contend that the mind is physically divided into two distinct systems/mechanisms so as 
to account for the clustering of processing features into two types. System 1, which enables fast, 
intuitive Type 1 processes, is generally considered an evolutionary older system we humans 
share with other animals. The slow, reflective Type 2 processing enabled by System 2 is thought 
to be a more recent evolutionary development distinctive to humans (Evans, 2008; Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013; Frankish, 2010; Frankish & Evans, 2009). Through this paper I will use “dual 
process theory” to refer to both process- and system-based theories, unless otherwise specified. 
 
3.2. Apperly & Butterfill’s Dual Process Theory of Mindreading 
 
Most contemporary theories of social cognition posit multiple processes and systems, but only 
some both make explicit use of dual process theory and apply it to mindreading phenomena. One 
of the most influential and fully articulated is Ian Apperly and Stephen Butterfill’s (Apperly, 
2011; Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Butterfill & Apperly, 2013a,b) dual system theory of how we 
understand others’ epistemic states such as perception, knowledge, and belief—states not 
typically included within the scope of the DSP thesis.  
 Apperly and Butterfill characterize our mindreading abilities as exhibiting competing 
cognitive demands for efficiency and flexibility (e.g., Apperly, 2011, pp. 8-9). Fast social 
interactions (e.g., playing sports) seem to require acting quickly in light of what others want, can 
and cannot see, etc. But to achieve this speed, these mindreading processes likely need to be 
cognitively efficient. In comparison, consider the task of a jury determining the guilt or 
innocence of a defendant. This involves mindreading the mental states of the defendant and 
others, but through a slow, deliberate, careful examination of the evidence. This also requires 
greater flexibility about the informational resources that could be relevant to making such 
mindreading attributions (p. 8). Such flexibility surely involves greater demands on memory and 
attention, and which means less cognitive efficiency.  
Apperly and Butterfill focus in particular on our ability to appreciate other agents’ 
perceptions, knowledge states, and beliefs, and how these epistemic mental states affect their 
goal-oriented behavior. On their view, these two types of mindreading phenomena are explained 
in terms of two types of mindreading systems: an early developing system for Type 1 
mindreading, and a later developing system for Type 2 mindreading. The early developing 
system’s defining feature is its cognitive efficiency. This enables its speed and automaticity, but 
comes at the price of exhibiting signature limits in the “kinds of input” it can process and the 
“kinds of operations performed on that input” (Apperly, 2011, p. 144). According to Apperly and 
Butterfill (2009; Butterfill & Apperly, 2013a), this early-developing mindreading system does 
not operate with full-blown concepts of mental states as propositional attitudes. Instead, it is a 
“minimal theory of mind” operating with simpler concepts of goals, perceptions, and “belief-
like” states. Minimal mindreading is argued to enable success on, for example, standard change-
of-location false belief tasks, where agent’s beliefs about the location of objects must be tracked. 
But such minimal mindreading would not enable appreciating that agents can represent the same 
object in different ways, via different visual appearances, descriptions or concepts (for recent 
supporting evidence, see Low & Watts, 2013; Low, Drummond, Walmsley, & Wang, 2014).  
“Full-blown” mindreading, where beliefs, desires, and intentions are represented as such, 
is thought to involve a separate, Type 2 style mechanism that develops later in childhood. This 
system is more flexible in its inputs, operations, and outputs, which lets it capture the complexity 
of the abductive inferences involved in full-blown mindreading. In particular, this flexibility is 
required to represent beliefs and desires as propositional attitudes that “form complex causal 
structures, have arbitrarily nestable contents, interact with each other in uncodifiably complex 
ways and are individuated by their causal and normative roles in explaining thoughts and 
actions” (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013a, pp. 609-610). To accomplish this requires a cognitive 
system that is not “informationally encapsulated,” but rather can access all information available 
elsewhere within the mind. Accordingly, this system must interface with a variety of other 
cognitive resources, particularly, language abilities, attention, memory, and executive control. It 
is these additional cognitive demands that would make System 2 mindreading more likely to be 
conscious, slow, controlled, and effortful (Apperly, 2011). Further, since these cognitive 
capacities develop across children’s first several years of life, Type 2 mindreading will develop 
later in childhood than Type 1. 
 
3.3. Apperly & Butterfill’s Type 1, “Minimal” Mindreading 
 
Given the goals of this paper, I will examine in greater detail Apperly and Butterfill’s account of 
Type 1 “minimal” mindreading involving the attribution of belief-like states.  
 
3.3.1. Concepts and Principles of Minimal Mindreading 
 
I will begin by explaining the concepts and principles of Apperly and Butterfill’s minimal 
mindreading account. Butterfill and Apperly (2013a) start with a teleological concept of goal as 
a simpler, non-representational version of the full-blown concepts of goal-directed actions and 
intentions. A minimal mindreading system represents agents as having goals in the sense of 
having outcomes toward which their body movements are directed. In other words, actions are 
understood as having the function of producing certain outcomes (e.g., grasping an object). To 
build an appreciation of why an agent might act toward a particular goal, Butterfill and Apperly 
introduce a minimal analog to the concept of perception, particularly, seeing. They define an 
agent’s field at a particular time as a certain spatial area around the agent, demarcated in terms of 
physical proximity to the agent, lighting conditions, the agent’s orientation, posture, and possibly 
eye direction. An agent is said to encounter an object when it falls within their field. 
Encountering is thus an agent-object relation that approximates the full-blown concept of 
perception, without capturing the representational, perspectival nature of genuine perception. 
Encountering is represented as a causal constraint on goal-directed action. Analogous to the 
principle that one cannot act on what one does cannot see, the minimal mindreading system uses 
the principle that “one cannot goal-directedly act on an object unless one has encountered it” (p. 
615). With such an understanding of goals and encountering, a minimal mindreader could predict 
that the agent will seek out only the objects they have perceived/encountered and act in light of 
this behavioral prediction.  
The concept of encountering is then used to define registration. Registration is a mental 
state analogous to belief in that it plays a certain functional role: it is causally related to the 
agent’s encounters and goal-directed actions. Registration is an agential state capturing a relation 
between an agent, an object, and a location, analogous to a belief’s being as an agent’s attitude 
toward a content (see Butterfill & Apperly, 2013b, pp. 7-9). One principle governing the notion 
of registration mimics the connection between perception and belief: usually an agent registers 
an object at a location “if and only if she most recently encountered it at that location” (2013a, p. 
617). Correctly registering an object is considered a condition for successful action (p. 617). 
Registration is also understood as a cause of action, via the principle that “when an agent 
performs a goal-directed action with a goal that specifies a particular object, the agent will act as 
if the object were in the location she registers it in” (p. 619). Accordingly, the concept of 
registration can function as a simplified way of tracking an agent’s true or false belief about an 
object’s location.  
By design, the minimal concept of registration is not a perfect analog for belief as a 
propositional attitude. As an extensional relation between agents, objects, and locations, a 
registration cannot capture the intensionality or perspectival nature of belief, i.e., the fact that 
beliefs represent objects in a particular way, using particular concepts or modes of presentation. 
So a minimal mindreader would not be able to track agent’s false beliefs involving mistakes of 
identity (e.g., failing to recognize that Superman and Clark Kent are distinct appearances of the 
same individual person). But ignoring the intensional nature of belief is exactly the kind of 
simplification that is supposed to make a minimal mindreading system cognitively efficient 
enough to enable fast, automatic mindreading of epistemic states.   
 
3.3.2. Is Minimal Mindreading Really Mindreading?  
 
One may ask whether the concepts of encountering and registration are similar enough to the 
concepts of perception and belief to be considered genuine mental state concepts. This is 
necessary if Apperly and Butterfill’s account is to be considered a minimal form of actual 
mindreading, and thus worth comparing to DSP.  
Butterfill and Apperly (2013a, p. 261, 2013b) explicitly argue that registration should be 
understood as a mental state concept because the minimal mindreader represents it as an 
“intervening variable” between environmental inputs and behavioral outputs. This is a common 
way philosophers and psychologists distinguish mindreading from non-mentalistic “behavior-
reading” strategies that only represent environmental inputs and behavioral outputs. Full-blown 
mindreading represents beliefs as agential states that are caused by perceptual states, and that 
causally produce (in combination with other mental states, such as desires) goal-directed actions. 
Analogously, registrations are states that are (often but not necessarily) caused by encounters 
with objects, and that, in light of an agent’s goals, causally lead to actions. The concept of 
registration thus differs from the full-blown concept of belief in terms of having a simpler 
functional role. Registrations also have simpler contents than beliefs: registrations do not have 
propositions as contents like beliefs do. But registration does share with belief the key features of 
being an intervening variable in a causal model and possessing contents. Registration is thus a 
simpler mental state concept than belief—but a mental state concept nonetheless. 
 Admittedly, defining the nature of mental states is notoriously controversial. But I 
believe this is a persuasive argument for considering registrations to be genuine mental states, 
and thus minimal mindreading to be genuine mindreading. While there is more to say about the 
nature of mental state concepts, the argument appeals to a well-motivated criterion for 
theoretically distinguishing mindreading from behavior-reading, which is commonly appealed to 
in the psychological and philosophical literature on mindreading. It should be noted, however, 
that Apperly and Butterfill make no attempt to apply this reasoning to encounters. Representing 
an agent’s encounter with an environmental object is just a way of describing which 
environmental objects the agent perceives, rather than a mental state representing those objects. 
This is a further way Apperly and Butterfill’s characterize Type 1 mindreading as simpler than 
full-blown mindreading. 
 
3.3.3. Applications of Type 1, Minimal Mindreading of Belief-Like States 
 
Apperly and Butterfill developed their account of minimal mindreading in order to capture the 
fast, automatic nature of Type 1 mindreading phenomena. To analyze it with respect to the DSP 
thesis, it will be helpful to see in greater detail how Type 1 mindreading of belief-like 
registration states is supposed to work. To do this, we can examine the experimental studies that 
Apperly and Butterfill interpret in terms of their early-developing, minimal mindreading system.   
Many of these experiments use change-of-location false belief tasks. In such tasks, 
participants are shown the following kind of scene, usually containing an agent, an object (e.g., a 
ball), and two containers located in front of the agent, where the object can be placed inside. The 
target agent first looks at the object being placed inside one of the containers—i.e., the agent’s 
head and eyes are directed toward it and no other objects obstruct their line of sight. Then the 
agent leaves the scene or looks away (i.e., turns their head and/or body sufficiently so the 
containers are not in their line of sight). While the agent is not looking, the object moves to the 
other container (on its own, or through the action of another person). The agent returns to look at 
the containers, with the object out of sight inside one. Since the target agent didn’t see the object 
move, upon their return they will continue to believe, falsely, that it is to be found in the original 
location. These false-belief scenes are typically interspersed with true-belief scenes: here the 
agent does observe the object’s placement in a new location, so has a true belief about its 
location throughout the scene. It is assumed in such studies that the agent wants the target object, 
and upon their return to the scene will act on the goal of seeking it out. The scene usually ends 
then with the agent reaching into a container to grab the object. Whether this seeking behavior is 
successful depends on whether they had a true or false belief about the object’s location. With 
studies involving children, the agent’s goal is sometimes made explicit by initially presenting 
scenes of the agent repeatedly reaching for that object, before presenting a true- or false-belief 
scene.  
One prototypical example of an “implicit” false belief task (see Low & Perner, 2012) 
given to children is Southgate et al. (2007). Their study presented 2-year-olds with videos of 
change-of-location scenarios involving a ball and two boxes. This was done after a 
familiarization phase to make explicit the agent’s goal of grasping the ball. The experimenters 
did not give children any explicit instructions about engaging in mindreading, but instead 
measured children’s looking behavior after the agent returned to looking at the boxes but prior to 
the agent’s reaching into a box. They recorded which of the two boxes children first looked at 
and spent the most time looking at during that time period. This anticipatory looking behavior 
was consistent with children’s representing the agent’s true or false belief about the ball’s 
location. Apperly and Butterfill’s minimal mindreading account posits instead that watching the 
beginning of the video leads children to automatically represent that the observed agent 
encountered the ball in the first box, and thus that they registered the ball as being at that 
location. This registration state will persist while the agent looks away from and then looks back 
at the boxes. Why? Because during that time the ball is not within the agent’s field and thus not 
encountered. Building in the assumption the agent has the goal of grasping the ball, this 
information leads the child to automatically expect the agent to reach into the first box, rather 
than the second box where the ball was actually located. This automatically generated behavioral 
prediction is expressed in the children’s anticipatory looking.  
Studies with adults attempt to more directly address the automaticity and implicitness of 
the attribution of belief-like states. They often do so by presenting the kind of mindreading-
inducing stimuli described above either (a) without any instructions to mindread, or (b) explicitly 
requiring participants to engage in a non-mindreading task. Examples of the latter are studies 
(e.g., Kovács et al., 2010; Schneider et al., 2012a, 2012b, 2014) that instruct participants to track 
the location of the object moved around during a change-of-location false belief scenario. If 
participants’ nonverbal behavior (specifically, looking behavior) conveys that they’ve 
represented that the observed agent is mistaken about the object’s location, despite this having 
nothing to do with their explicit task, this suggests participants are automatically, implicitly 
engaging in attribution of belief-like states. Schneider’s work suggests this Type 1 mindreading 
of belief-like states occurs without any conscious awareness (Schneider et al., 2012a), and is 
unintentional and uncontrollable (Schneider et al., 2014).1  
Other automaticity studies (e.g., Cohen & German, 2009, 2010) use a similar setup, 
having participants explicitly engage in a non-mindreading, object-tracking task. But they 
instead use a verbal task: they measure participants’ reaction times in responding to questions 
about the object’s location at the end of the video (e.g., “It is true that the object is in the location 
on the left”) vs. questions about the agent’s belief (e.g., “She thinks the object is in the location 
on the left”). If they respond just as quickly to both questions types, despite not being asked to 
track the observed agent’s mental states, it suggests participants were automatically, implicitly 
mindreading while watching the video. Butterfill and Apperly (2013a) are not that specific about 
the uses to which minimal mindreading representations can be put, but do explicitly mention that 
representations of belief-like states could “be verbalized in terms of what an agent ‘thinks’” (p. 
627).2 So this suggests automaticity studies such as these using verbal test stimuli could also be 
explained in terms of Type 1 minimal mindreading of belief-like states.  
 
 
4. Type 1 Processes and Perception 
 
For the purposes of this paper, I will be assuming Apperly and Butterfill’s two-system account is 
well motivated theoretically and empirically (for recent critiques, see Carruthers, 2013; 
Thompson, 2014). My concern here is whether or not the sort of fast, automatic, Type 1 
mindreading of belief-like states they describe should be considered perceptual in nature; in 
other words, I want to determine whether dual process theories of mindreading such as this one 
fit with DSP or provide an alternative way of describing the phenomena identified by DSP 
advocates. 
To address this issue, I will first examine how dual process theorists themselves talk 
about perception. Then I will address how such an account of perception compares to DSP’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 One problematic piece of evidence is Schneider et al.’s (2012b) dual-task study, which found that minimal 
mindreading is disrupted by high cognitive load, an indicator that it depends on executive resources (e.g., working 
memory). This is contrary to Apperly and Butterfill’s account of System 1 mindreading’s cognitive efficiency.  
2 This appears to be a modification of their view over time, since Apperly (2011, p. 134) seemed to categorize verbal 
tasks as Type 2 phenomena. 
 
phenomenological and psychological theses, and whether Apperly and Butterfill’s Type 1 
attribution of belief-like registration states should count as perceptual in nature.  
 
4.1.  Dual Process Theorists and Others on Perception vs. Cognition 
 
Although dual process theorists often use perception to help define Type 1 processes, they tend 
to treat perception as distinct from and providing input to Type 1 and 2 psychological processes. 
For example, Kahneman (2003) makes a tri-part distinction between perception, System 1 
“intuition,” and System 2 “reasoning.” System 1 is defined as being similar to perception with 
regard to several “operating characteristics”: “fast, parallel, automatic, effortless, associative, 
slow learning, and emotional” (p. 698). But perception and System 1 are distinguished by their 
contents and functional inputs. Kahneman claims that perception operates with “percepts” while 
System 1 operates with both percepts and “conceptual representations.” The only analysis given 
of the distinction between perceptual and conceptual representations is functional. Percepts are 
“stimulus-bound” in the sense of being generated by “current stimulation” (p. 698). In contrast, 
System 1 operations can be evoked by this type of perceptual information, as well as conceptual 
representations not tied to current stimulation, e.g., representations of past, present, or future. In 
addition, Kahneman makes clear that System 1 can take as input linguistic representations. So 
Kahneman’s general dual process theory treats perception as functionally distinct from and 
providing one type of input to Type/System 1 and 2 processes.  
In his dual process theory of mindreading, Apperly (2011, pp. 119-125) similarly 
analogizes fast, Type 1 mindreading to perceptual processes (e.g., vision). He says both seem to 
be enabled by psychological “modules”: “informationally encapsulated” mechanisms that are 
cognitively efficient in that they “perform specific operations using their own small set of 
knowledge and representational sources, and are receptive to only a small set of external inputs” 
(p. 120). Later he claims that slow, Type 2 mindreading “seems less like perception [compared to 
Type 1 mindreading] and more like reasoning” (p. 125). But Apperly does not go so far as to 
actually describe Type 1 mindreading as perceptual in nature; he, like Kahneman, only notes 
similarities between Type 1 mindreading and perception. Generally Apperly and Butterfill refer 
to mindreading as a type of “reasoning,” where mental state representations are produced by 
processes of “inference” from information about behavior.  
 In sum, dual process theorists often treat perception as separate from the two processing 
types/systems they identify. It would seem on this view perception is characterized as generating 
fairly low-level representations of environmental objects and their properties, which can be 
further processed by Type 1 and 2 processes. Given the numerous connections dual process 
theorists draw between perception and Type 1 processes, one could ask whether it is more 
theoretically appropriate to categorize perception as a kind of Type 1 process, rather than a 
separate psychological kind distinct from Type 1 and 2 processes.  
In light of various criticisms waged against dual process theories over the years, Evans 
and Stanovich (2013) offer a refined dual process theory that does re-categorize perception in 
this way. They define Type 1 processes in terms of a single essential feature: being autonomous 
processes. Processes are said to be autonomous when their execution “is mandatory when their 
triggering stimuli are encountered and … are not dependent on input from high-level control 
system,” so make minimal demands on working memory (p. 236). This definition of autonomous 
processes thus combines the two notions of automaticity and cognitive impenetrability or 
informational-encapsulation. Departing from the idea that Type 1 processes are enabled by a 
single physical system, Evans and Stanovich (2013, p. 236) identify a host of different 
psychological mechanisms that meet this definition, from traditional Fodorian modules (Fodor, 
1983) to general processes of implicit learning and conditioning. On Evans and Stanovich’s dual 
process account, while not all Type 1 processes would be perceptual, autonomous perceptual 
processes would count as Type 1 processes. This view has the advantage of recognizing the 
many similarities between perception and other Type 1 processes by treating them as being of 
the same psychological kind.3  
Another virtue of Evans and Stanovich’s account is that it is consistent with an account of 
perception that has been highly influential view across psychology and philosophy: the view that 
perceptual processes are modular in nature (e.g., Fodor, 1983; Pylyshyn, 1999; Scholl & Gao, 
2013; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000). Though many have departed from Fodor’s full definition of 
modularity, this is usually taken to mean that perception meets the following four conditions: (a) 
it is mandatory or automatic, i.e., operates whenever presented with a particular, limited range of 
inputs, without the need for conscious control or effort; (b) it operates unconsciously, with only 
the final outputs being potentially accessible to consciousness; (c) it is cognitively impenetrable 
or informationally encapsulated, i.e., insensitive to information contained in other cognitive 
mechanisms; and (d) it is fast in speed. Given this definition, modular perception would be 
classified as autonomous and thus a Type 1 process. 
These features of modular mechanisms, however, would not alone be sufficient to 
distinguish perception from other non-perceptual, modular Type 1 mechanisms. For example, a 
Type 1 process automatically producing the solution to “2+2” clearly does not lead us to 
perceive the answer. Beyond the above four features of modularity, we need to capture the fact 
that perception is based on our causal contact with the world. Kahneman (2003) captured this 
idea when claiming that perceptual processes use as their inputs the “current stimulation” of our 
sense receptors. Let’s call this fifth condition stimulus-sensitivity.  
Scholl and Gao (2013) offer a detailed articulation of such a modular view of perception, 
including the requirement of stimulus-sensitivity. They characterize this idea of stimulus-
sensitivity by writing that “a hallmark feature of perception (vs. cognition) is its strict 
dependence on subtle visual display [or other sensory input] details; percepts seem to be 
irresistibly controlled by the nuances of the visual [or other sensory] input regardless of our 
knowledge, intentions, or decisions” (p. 209). This passage captures Kahneman’s idea that 
perception must originate from sensory input. But it goes further by claiming that variations in 
perceptual states are “irresistibly controlled by” nuanced sensory cues, and thus largely 
unaffected by other psychological factors such as our beliefs and intentions. This stronger notion 
of stimulus-sensitivity thus incorporates traditional features of modularity such as automaticity 
and informational-encapsulation. Whether we bundle automaticity and informational-
encapsulation into our definition of “stimulus-sensitivity,” or use that phrase to refer just to the 
fact that perception’s inputs are impingements of our sensory organs, seems just a terminological 
difference. The modular view of perception is well captured by this package of functional traits. 
In sum, the modular view characterizes perception as involving the fast, automatic, 
informationally-encapsulated processing of sensory inputs.  
Note that the above description does not specify the nature of the outputs of perceptual 
processes, other than that they may be conscious or unconscious. Some in the modularity camp 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  An	  earlier	  co-­‐authored	  work	  of	  Kahneman’s	  strongly	  emphasizes	  the	  “perception-­‐like”	  nature	  of	  Type	  1	  “intuitive	  thinking,”	  even	  saying	  “The	  boundary	  between	  perception	  and	  judgment	  is	  fuzzy	  and	  permeable”	  (Kahneman	  &	  Frederick,	  2002,	  p.	  50).	  	  	  
(e.g., Fodor, 1983) have defended the idea that perceptual outputs are rather “shallow,” only 
representing simple “low-level” features. In the case of vision, this would include “shapes and 
other spatial properties or relations, textures, colors, lightness, and motion” (Burge, 2014, p. 
575). This seems to be Kahneman’s (2003) view. But there is increasing evidence that perception 
can include “higher-level” contents as well—even if one accepts the modular view that 
perception is not cognitively penetrable. For example, Burge (2010) surveys empirical research 
that the human visual system can perceptually represent bodies (i.e., three-dimensional shapes 
with connected boundaries). Block (2014) and Burge (2014) discuss evidence that humans also 
visually represent high-level properties like faces. Furthermore, Scholl and Gao (2013) explicitly 
adopt a modular view of perception when defending the idea that humans can visually perceive 
animacy and goal-directed action (see also Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000). They mainly focus on 
perceiving “chasing,” i.e., one agent acting with the goal of catching another agent. That the 
modular view of perception could permit the perception of goals, even in a minimal sense, shows 
the potential compatibility between the modular view and the DSP thesis.  
To recap: starting from the dual process literature’s discussions of perception, I have 
motivated treating perception as a kind of Type 1 process, rather than as a kind of input to Type 
1 and 2 processes. This is possible if Type 1 processes are characterized as autonomous, broadly 
modular processes. From this perspective, perception, if modular in nature, can be classified as a 
kind of Type 1 process. To be distinguished from other modular Type 1 processes, perception 
must exhibit the additional condition of stimulus-sensitivity. This modular account thus defines 
perception in terms of the functional processing characteristics of being fast, 
automatic/mandatory, informationally encapsulated, and stimulus-sensitive, with these processes 
operating outside conscious awareness, and only its products or outputs as potentially accessible 
to consciousness. This modular view of perception is not only compatible with dual process 
theory, but is a very common account of perception throughout philosophy and psychology. 
These are two reasons for this paper to take seriously the modular view of perception. Another is 
that the modular view of perception allows for not just low-level perceptual content, but higher-
level features. This includes bodies, faces, and action goals—which means the modular view is 
compatible with the DSP thesis that mental states are perceivable.  
 
4.2.  Phenomenological vs. Psychological Definitions of Perception 
 
How does this modular view of perception relate to the phenomenological and psychological 
theses of DSP? First, note that the modular view defines perception in terms of functional, 
subpersonal-level processing characteristics (speed, automaticity, information-encapsulation, and 
stimulus-sensitivity). The only mention of phenomenology is the claim that the processes 
generating percepts are introspectively opaque. But this view also allows for fully unconscious 
perception, where both the process and the end product of perception remains outside of 
conscious awareness (see Burge, 2014, p. 583). Further, this view’s advocates explicitly reject 
the idea that phenomenology alone is sufficient to distinguish perception from cognition. As 
Pylyshyn (1999) puts it: “…phenomenology turns out to be an egregiously unreliable witness” 
about the nature of perception and cognition because “Our subjective experience of the world 
fails to distinguish among the various sources of this experience, whether they arise from the 
visual system or from our beliefs” (p. 362). That is, phenomenological methods may help 
identify the conscious content of an experience. But introspection does not identify whether this 
experience is generated from perception or, as Block (2014) puts it, is “primarily the ‘cognitive 
phenomenology’ of a conceptual over-lay on perception” (p. 566). The empirical techniques of 
perceptual psychology and neuroscience are required to get at the sources of our experiential 
states.  
For example, Block (2014) argues that adaptation studies can help to determine whether 
an experience is perceptual or cognitive. These studies appeal to the phenomenon of perceptual 
adaptation: when a neural system receives a certain type of sensory stimulation for a period of 
time, it adapts to this stimulation, making it easier to respond to other stimuli of that type. For 
example, Block (2014, pp. 563-564) describes an adaptation study (Butler et al., 2008) 
suggesting we possess higher-level visual representations of facial expressions like anger and 
fear. In the study, participants stare at, say, a fearful face. Because of perceptual adaptation, 
when they next look at a face ambiguous between fear and anger, they are biased to see it as a 
fearful face. When the same lower-level features (e.g., orientation, curvature, shape) are 
presented but not in the coherent structure constitutive of a recognizable facial expression, the 
adaptation effect is extinguished. This suggests the perceptual representation displaying 
adaptation is genuinely a higher-level representation of a facial expression. According to Block 
(see also Scholl & Gao, 2013, p. 206), there is no evidence that conceptual representations 
display such adaptation effects. So adaptation studies serve as a useful type of evidence to 
identify the contents of perception as distinct from cognition—notably, one that gives no direct 
role to phenomenological evidence. 
I believe this offers a substantial challenge to DSP’s phenomenological thesis, which 
distinguishes experientially direct, perceptual mindreading from non-perceptual mindreading that 
is experientially indirect because it involves conscious reasoning. If the modular view of 
perception is correct, a mental state attribution could, in principle, be experientially direct 
because (a) it is generated by a perceptual process, or (b) a top-down cognitive process operates 
outside of awareness and outputs a conscious mental state attribution. Accordingly, 
phenomenological contents would be inadequate to define such experiences as perceptual or non-
perceptual in nature.  
While the modular view of perception challenges DSP’s phenomenological thesis, it does 
not mean a deathblow for DSP. The modular account offers a psychological definition of 
perception that is more robust and empirically motivated than DSP’s negative psychological 
thesis (which simply define DSP as not involving theory- or simulation-based inference). In 
addition, the modular account admits the existence of higher-level perceptual contents—indeed, 
some of its adherents have already marshaled evidence suggesting some mental states should be 
included amongst the list of perceptual contents. As already mentioned, Scholl and Gao (2013) 
explicitly argue that humans can visually perceive actions as animate and goal-directed. They 
remain open what concept of “goal” is supported by this research; but Apperly and Butterfill’s 
minimal teleological concept seems a plausible option. This means there are at least some major 
adherents of the modular view that appear to endorse the DSP thesis with regard to perceiving 
goals. This is not quite the direct perception of intentions as such, but it is nonetheless an 
endorsement of DSP. The modular view of perception may also be compatible with the 
perception of other mental states that already fall within the scope of the DSP thesis: emotions. 
As just mentioned, Block (2014) discusses evidence that humans visually perceive emotion-
related facial expressions (e.g., angry vs. fearful faces). Depending how one fills out DSP, this is 
a short step away from saying we directly perceive emotions themselves. Some DSP advocates 
argue that bodily movements are literal constituents of emotions. Accordingly, they argue that by 
seeing a proper part of an emotion (a facial expression) we are directly seeing the emotion itself, 
rather than simply an external sign of an emotion (Gallagher & Varga, 2014; Krueger & 
Overgaard, 2012). This argument is still open to them with the modular view of perception. 
From the perspective of DSP, another benefit of the modular view of perception is that it 
at least partially supports DSP’s treatment of TT and ST as accounts of cognition and not 
perception. Recall that a core feature of the modular view is that perceptual systems are 
informationally encapsulated from an agent’s beliefs, desires, and intentions. If TT treats a folk 
psychological theory as just a subset of the beliefs we have about the world, then such beliefs 
would be part of “central cognition” (Fodor, 1983) and not be accessible by modular perceptual 
systems. Similarly, if ST says we use our own beliefs, desires, and other mental states to simulate 
the mental states of another person, these representations would similarly be cut off from our 
encapsulated perceptual modules. Thus, the modular view of perception supports treating certain 
versions of TT and ST as cognitive and not perceptual. The modular view does, however, appear 
compatible with the idea that our perceptual modules themselves contain theoretical information 
about the mind so as to automatically generate perceptual representations of other agents’ mental 
states. So the modular view of perception does not completely endorse DSP negative 
psychological thesis, but is still consistent with a good portion of it. 
In sum, I believe DSP ultimately has nothing too significant to fear and much to gain 
from the modular view of perception. While the modular view challenges the use of 
phenomenology to define perception, its psychological definition of perception has significant 
advantages over DSP’s negative psychological thesis. For one, it more positively characterizes 
the processing and representational properties characteristic of perception and cognition. But it 
does so while allowing for mental states to be high-level perceptual contents. The modular view 
even partially supports DSP’s resistance to treating TT and ST as parts of perception. DSP 
should welcome this sort of attempt to use perceptual psychology to define the psychological 
characteristics of perception.  
The final step in my argument will be to consider what the modular view should say 
about Apperly and Butterfill’s account of Type 1 minimal mindreading of belief-like states.  
 
4.3.  Is Type 1 Mindreading of Belief-Like States a Form of DSP? 
 
Assuming the modular view of perception is endorsed, what should it say about Apperly and 
Butterfill’s account of Type 1 minimal mindreading of belief-like states?  
Recall the modular account’s definition of perception: perception involves fast, 
automatic, informationally-encapsulated, stimulus-sensitive processes, whose products may or 
may not be consciously accessible. According to Apperly and Butterfill’s dual process account, 
does Type 1 belief-like state attribution fit this definition? On their account, the attribution of 
belief-like states is fast, automatically generated by a relatively narrow-range of stimuli, and 
informationally encapsulated. The experiments using change-of-location false-belief tasks 
described in section 3.3.3 provide empirical support for this interpretation of minimal 
mindreading as fast, automatic, and informationally encapsulated. Further, if Schneider’s 
findings prove correct, Type 1 belief-like state representations are not consciously accessible. 
This is not a problem for the modular account, which permits unconscious perceptual states. But 
as an empirical claim, it should be noted that it is inconsistent with the interpretation of Cohen 
and German’s (2009, 2010) verbal tasks, which seem to require conscious awareness of one’s 
belief-like state representations. 
That covers four of the five requirements of the modular theory of perception. What 
about the requirement of stimulus-sensitivity? Consider the interpretation of the stimulus-
sensitivity condition which requires that percepts are generated in a bottom-up fashion from 
physical impingements upon our sensory transducers, encapsulated from top-down influence by 
one’s beliefs, desires, and intentions. Apperly and Butterfill’s account of Type 1 belief-like state 
attribution fits this definition of the stimulus-sensitivity condition. They claim minimal 
mindreading is informationally encapsulated, with belief-like state representations automatically 
generated in a bottom-up fashion from sensory stimuli. The automaticity studies described in 
section 3.3.3 (e.g., Kovács et al., 2010; Schneider et al., 2012a, 2012b, 2014) provide empirical 
support for this interpretation: regardless of a person’s explicit goals (e.g., those defined by the 
instructions given to participants), these studies found evidence that visually observing the 
relevant stimuli automatically produced attributions of belief-like states. This would mean Type 
1 mindreading of belief-like states meets all the requirements of the modular view of perception, 
and is thus an extension of the scope of the DSP thesis to a kind of epistemic state. 
Scholl and Gao’s (2013) interpretation of the stimulus-sensitivity condition is, however, 
more robust. In addition to being insensitive to our beliefs and intentions, they propose that 
perceptual processes display a “dramatic dependence on subtle visual display details” (p. 209). 
Block’s (2014) discussion of adaptation studies similarly emphasizes the importance of a careful 
examining of how observers respond to different stimuli. Scholl and Gao (2013), however, 
indicate that adaptations studies are not appropriate for sensory cues that are “so necessarily 
dynamic in both space and time,” such as the animated displays of moving geometric figures 
used in their studies to cue the perception of chasing (p. 206). This suggests adaptation studies 
would also be unhelpful for studying whether Type 1 mindreading of belief-like states is robustly 
stimulus-sensitive.  
One argument Scholl and Gao (2013) make with respect to visually perceiving goals is 
that performance on visuomotor tasks, rather than verbal tasks, is a good indicator of a genuine 
perceptual process and not a cognitive judgment. For example, their studies of chasing 
perception (Gao, McCarthy, & Scholl, 2010; Gao, Newman, & Scholl, 2009; Gao & Scholl, 
2011) require participants to watch a computer display filled with moving geometric shapes 
identical in color and shape, one of which (“the wolf”) is chasing one other (“the sheep”). One 
task given to participants was to control the sheep’s movements to avoid getting caught by the 
wolf. This task thus requires perceiving the wolf as having the goal of chasing the sheep. These 
studies manipulated in various ways the visual cues underlying chasing. For example, Gao et al. 
(2009) varied the wolf’s “Chasing Subtlety,” defined as “the maximal angular deviation of the 
wolf’s heading compared to perfect heat seeking” (Scholl & Gao, 2013, p. 211). “Perfect heat 
seeking” means the wolf is always heading directly toward the sheep; this is described as a 
Chasing Subtlety value of 0°. A Chasing Subtlety value of 30° means the wolf is always heading 
within 30° to the left or to the right of the direction of the sheep. They found that participants 
were better at perceiving the wolf when Chasing Subtlety was 0° as opposed to 30°. In addition, 
participants had a very hard time detecting the wolf when Chasing Subtlety was as large as 90°. 
Although the wolf was actually chasing the sheep in all cases, varying this visual (motion) cue 
dramatically affected an observer’s ability to perceive the chasing. As they put it, these studies 
“reveal stark limits on the ability of observers to simply ‘decide’ what counts as chasing. Rather, 
the implicit performance measures seem to be tapping into an underlying ability whose limits 
cannot be influenced merely by decisions about what features should matter for detecting 
animacy; rather, only those factors that actually do matter will facilitate detection and avoidance” 
(p. 214). For this reason, Scholl and Gao argue that such visuomotor measures are good ways of 
determining whether a response is robustly stimulus-sensitive and thus truly a perceptual 
phenomenon.  
Existing studies of belief understanding have failed to examine the precise sensory cues 
that trigger Type 1 attribution of belief-like states (for initial discussions of such a cue-based 
approach to the study of mindreading, see German & Cohen, 2012; Wertz & German, 2013). So 
there is not the kind of research needed to say whether Type 1 attribution of belief-like states is 
robustly stimulus-sensitive. But there are a few things we can say to motivate thinking it might 
well be.  
First, note that many of the existing studies of Type 1 belief attribution follow Scholl and 
Gao’s recommendation of using visuomotor tasks. Specifically, as described in section 3.3.3, 
many studies use nonverbal measures of looking behavior. Admittedly, looking behavior can be 
a conscious, intentional action. But Scholl and Gao argued that visuomotor tasks are good test of 
what participants automatically perceive, rather than what they choose to believe about the 
world. The nonverbal mindreading tasks similarly test participants’ implicit looking behavior. 
They do not give participants any explicit instructions to engage in looking behavior; some even 
explicitly engage participants in a task unrelated to mindreading. Nonetheless, participants 
display anticipatory looking behavior indicative of attributing belief-like states based on the 
visual stimuli presented to them. This suggests that participants can’t help but seeing the 
observed agents as possessing belief-like states about object locations, just like the participants in 
Scholl and Gao’s studies couldn’t help seeing chasing. This interpretation is consistent with 
Apperly and Butterfill’s view that Type 1 mindreading is inflexible in the uses to which its 
mental state representations can be put, with “implicit” behavioral tasks such as predictive eye 
movements included and slow, conscious reasoning excluded. Such inflexibility suggests the 
outputs of Type 1 mindreading process are not fully part of “central” cognition in Fodor’s (1983) 
sense. This limited inferential role for the mental state representations generated by Type 1 
mindreading processes makes it more plausible that they are modality-specific perceptual 
processes fairly directly influencing behavioral output.  
In addition, note that most of the existing studies of Type 1 belief-like state attribution 
use remarkably similar visual stimuli. This is consistent with Apperly and Butterfill’s view that 
Type 1 mindreading is relatively inflexible and efficient in terms of being generated by a limited 
range of input conditions. As described in section 3.3.3, most of these studies use nearly identical 
videos of change-of-location false-belief scenarios. Further, the visual stimuli used to induce 
representations of belief-like registration states seem even less dynamic than the studies of 
chasing perception. All that’s presented to cue a representation of a belief-like registration state 
is a depiction of an agent encountering an object within their field—i.e., an agent directs their 
head and eyes toward an object with nothing obstructing their line of sight. This stimulus is 
temporally rather short, and is relatively simple in the number of objects and relations to be 
tracked. The false-belief scenario continues after this, but then the main requirement of the 
mindreader is not to update their initial representation of where the agent registers the object as 
being located, because the agent does not again encounter it. Perhaps subtle changes in the visual 
cues would lead to disruptions of the minimal mindreading system’s ability to generate 
representations of encountering and, subsequently, belief-like registration states. For instance, 
perhaps small modifications in the orientation of the eyes and head of the observed agent, or the 
introduction of distractor objects, could cause such disruptions in mindreading of belief-like 
states. Without further studies, we simply do not know whether Type 1 belief-like state 
attribution is robustly stimulus-sensitive in this way. Recall that Apperly and Butterfill’s point in 
developing their account of minimal mindreading was to characterize a way to track others’ 
beliefs in a cognitively efficient manner. It seems possible that this efficiency involves even 
further “signature limits” in its range of inputs than they initially thought. 
Another way to go is to argue that Scholl and Gao’s notion of robust stimulus-sensitivity 
is simply too strong a requirement on perception. Perhaps some but not all perceptual 
phenomena are robustly stimulus-sensitive. If that’s the case, all we need for genuine perception 
of belief-like states is that belief-like state representations are automatically generated from 
sensory input, while being informationally encapsulated from our beliefs, intentions, and other 
higher-order psychological states. I already argued above that Apperly and Butterfill’s 
characterization of their theory fulfills this weaker interpretation of stimulus-sensitivity, as well 
as the other functional requirements of the modular view of perception (speed and automaticity), 
and that the existing experimental research provides decently strong empirical support for this 
position.  
Before I end, it is worth considering a type of objection commonly raised against DSP: 
are belief-like states the kind of state that is even capable of being perceived? This objection is 
grounded in questions about the metaphysical relation between mental states and physical 
behavior. If mental states are literally “inner causes” of physical behavior, it seems that only 
behavior is literally perceivable. DSP advocates have given different answers to this worry; one 
is that behavior is a constitutive part of some mental states, so that the mental state is perceived 
by perceiving the behavior (see Krueger & Overgaard, 2012). As discussed earlier, this is a main 
reason that DSP has been defended mainly for emotions and intentions, which have more tight 
connections to behavior than epistemic mental states.  
I believe the modular account offers a helpful response to this worry, which does not 
depend upon addressing the metaphysics of the mind-body relation. For the modular account, 
perception occurs when the appropriate stimulus cues automatically trigger a perceptual 
representation of that feature, in a bottom-up, informationally encapsulated fashion. Technically, 
the represented feature need not actually be present in the environment at all. For example, in 
Scholl and Gao’s studies of chasing perception, there are no real animate agents present—only 
animated videos of geometric figures displaying the appropriate cues to trigger percepts of goals 
(see Scholl & Gao, 2013, p. 206). Similarly, consider “amodal completion,” which is the 
“capacity to perceptually represent an entity as whole or completed, even though less than the 
whole entity causally affects the sensory apparatus” (Burge, 2010, p. 417). An example often 
used by DSP advocates is that even if only the front side of an object causally impinges upon our 
retinas, the object’s backside is experienced as present. These are cases where our perceptual 
systems generate perceptual representations that go beyond the information present in the 
sensory stimuli (e.g., Burge, 2010, pp. 417, 448). Thus, whether belief-like states are perceivable 
is, for this modular account, can’t simply be an issue of whether mental states physically impinge 
upon our sense organs, or are in some other way “directly present” to our senses. Rather, what 
matters is whether our perceptual systems are set up to be automatically triggered by specific 
cues to form percepts representing other people’s belief-like states. That is, it is a matter of the 
content of our perceptual states that are produced by modular perceptual systems. As I argued 
above, Apperly and Butterfill’s theoretical account of an early-developing, minimal mindreading 
system seems to fit this requirement, and has a growing amount of empirical support behind it. 
The kind of empirical research described by Block (2014) and Burge (2014) seems most relevant 
to more adequately addressing the empirical merits of this claim.  
In sum, the account of Type 1 belief-like state attribution offered by Apperly and 
Butterfill largely fits the modular definition of perception, with the stimulus-sensitivity condition 
being the main theoretical and empirical sticking point. If the modular view of perception is 
adopted by DSP, then there is good reason for extending the scope of the DSP thesis beyond 
goals and emotions to belief-like epistemic states.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
My examination of the relationship between DSP and dual process theories of mindreading has 
reached several, admittedly tentative, conclusions. One is that dual process theory has good 
reason to treat perceptual processes as a subset of Type 1, fast, automatic processes, rather than a 
separate psychological kind that provides some of the inputs for Type 1 and 2 processes. This 
entails adopting a modular view of perception that has widespread support across philosophy and 
psychology. Further, I have argued that this view of perception provides substantial advantages 
over existing phenomenological and psychological formulations of DSP. The modular view 
recommends completely abandoning a phenomenological definition of perception, and instead 
focusing on functional and other processing characteristics of psychological processes to define 
perception.  
If such a modular account of perception is adopted, I have argued that DSP remains a 
viable account of at least some modular Type 1 mindreading phenomena. Specifically, the 
existing scope of the DSP thesis to the mindreading of goals and emotions can arguably be 
retained, and perhaps given even greater empirical support by studies from vision science. 
Further, I have argued that the modular view of perception can seems able to widen the scope of 
the DSP thesis to include some epistemic states—specifically, Apperly and Butterfill’s account 
of Type 1 mindreading of belief-like states.  
 This conclusion that the scope of the DSP thesis may be extended to belief-like states is, 
however, entirely conditional upon the acceptance of the modular view of perception. But the 
modular view of perception, while influential, is certainly controversial. Many critics reject the 
modular view’s depiction of perception as a wholly bottom-up, informationally-encapsulated 
process. They instead endorse the cognitive penetrability of perception, contending that 
perception can be influenced by our beliefs and intentions in a top-down fashion (e.g., Siegel, 
2010, 2011). What would the rejection of the modular view of perception and adoption of the 
cognitive penetrability thesis about perception mean for DSP? I only have room here to offer a 
few speculative conclusions about this important possibility. 
 First, I think that admitting the cognitive penetrability of perception would not save 
DSP’s original psychological thesis. Recall that DSP’s psychological thesis negatively defines 
direct perception of mental states as not involving theory- or simulation-based inferences. But if 
perception can be penetrated in a “top-down” way by cognitive processes, and folk psychological 
theorizing and simulation are cognitive processes, what prevents these cognitive processes from 
being some of the ones that cognitively penetrate perception?  
More significantly, rejecting the modular account’s picture of our cognitive architecture 
may generate a more fundamental threat to DSP. As Shea (2014) argues, accepting a non-
modular view of perception may have the consequence of blurring the divide between perception 
and cognition. How so? Because the modular view seems to define perception in terms of 
“bottom-up” processes that build up from sensory input, and cognition in terms of “top-down” 
processes that depend on representational resources that are “higher” in the sense of being further 
in the processing hierarchy away from sensory input. And if we reject the modular view’s 
definition of perception and cognition in terms of bottom-up vs. top-down processes, we’d find 
ourselves with a continuum of psychological processes that vary in how much they involve 
bottom-up vs. top-down influences. But we may lack a principled reason for calling some 
perceptual and others cognitive. Accordingly, rejecting the modular, bottom-up view of 
perception risks losing traction on how to demarcate perception from cognition. And without a 
strict distinction between perception and cognition, it could be difficult to even formulate DSP as 
a psychological thesis.  
 If these speculations hold true, adopting the cognitive penetrability of perception may be 
problematic for DSP, while its rival, the modular view, may be more accommodating. But 
adjudicating the debate about the cognitive penetrability or impenetrability of perception is itself 
a huge project for philosophers and psychologists. One point I hope we can all agree about, 
however, is that we need to devote more attention to accurately identifying the 
phenomenological and subpersonal-level processing- and representational-properties of 
mindreading phenomena—in line with German and Cohen’s (2012) cue-based approach to 
mindreading research. Only with such data will we be able to make empirically informed claims 
about the architecture of the psychological processes underlying mindreading.  
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